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Rhetorical Questions Concerning Justice and
Equality in Educational Opportunities
Michael J. Kaufman *
[I]t remains the current reality that many minority students encounter
markedly inadequateand unequaleducationalopportunities.
-Justice Ginsburg'
The Constitutionproscribesgovernment discriminationon the basis of
race, andstate-providededucation is no exception.
-Justice Scalia 2
INTRODUCTION

What role does equality play in a conception of justice? Although
Aristotle forever linked justice to equality,3 he also understood that the
principle of equality could not itself resolve any important
jurisprudential question. Aristotle's maxim that "like cases should be
treated in a like manner" and its corollary that "unlike cases should be
treated in an unlike manner '' are both tautological.5 The principle of
equality begs the question of which people affected by a law should
have equal status or rights.6 Even if a regime presumes that all persons
Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part). In his dissent in Grutter,
Justice Thomas similarly argued that the race-conscious university admissions policy upheld by
the Court "can only weaken the principle of equality embodied in the Declaration of
Independence and the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 378 (Thomas, J., dissenting),
3. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1131a (H.G. Apostle trans., 1984) [hereinafter
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS]. See also Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 537, 543 (1982) [hereinafter The Empty Idea of Equality] (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS,
Book III§ 9 1280a, Book III § 12 1282b-1283a, Book V § 1 1301a-1301b (B. Jowett trans.,
1921) [hereinafter POLITICS], to argue that equality in a jurisprudential sense masks true
inequality).
4. See POLITICS, supra note 3, at Book III § 9 1280a, Book III §12 1282b (illustrating
Aristotle's principle of equality).
5. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, supra note 3, at 544-48.
6. Aristotle recognized that each regime would have to reach the political judgment about
whether its citizens were "like" or "unalike." He understood that linking justice with equality
begged the political question of the relevance of similarities and differences: "All men agree that
what is just in distribution should be according to merit of some sort, but not all men agree as to
*
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are naturally entitled to equal protection of the laws, important
judgments about which cases should be treated alike still cannot be
resolved without legal, moral, or political standards independent of
equality.
As American courts reach such judgments based on standards other
than equality, the language of equality becomes useful only as a
rhetorical device. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Justices
Scalia and Ginsburg both employ the rhetoric of equality to support
profoundly different conceptions of justice. The rhetoric of equality can
be manipulated to cloud judicial decisions which are actually based on
independent values. Phatic appeals to equality are particularly evident
in the Supreme Court's significant decisions addressing race-conscious
and gender-conscious educational programs.
THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE AND ITS PERSUASIVE CRITICS

In a seminal series of publications, Professor Peter Westen shows that
Aristotle's principle of equality is circular, and thus cannot be employed
to resolve any jurisprudential question without reference to
"substantive" values or rights wholly apart from equality itself.7
Professor Westen dissects each part of the Aristotelian equality
principle. First, the formula requires a determination of whether two or
more persons are, or should be, alike for purposes of application of the
equality principle. 8 Because no two persons are truly alike, that
determination depends on a judgment about the relevance of the
undeniable differences between people. 9 People are alike only if their
10
differences are judged (by some external standard) to be irrelevant.
Second, Westen shows that "treatments can be alike only in reference
to some moral rule." 11 The judgment about whether the law should
treat people alike or unalike depends on the moral rule or independent
legal standard by which it was determined that their similarities and
dissimilarities are morally or legally relevant. A law cannot be judged,
therefore, by the extent to which it treats people equally. Westen
what that merit should be ....

NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 3, at 1131a.

7. PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF
EQUALITY IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990) [hereinafter SPEAKING OF EQUALITY];
Peter Westen, The Meaning ofEquality in Law, Science, Math and Morals: A Reply, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 604 (1983) [hereinafter The Meaning of Equality]; Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality,
supra note 3, at 537.
8. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, supra note 3, at 543.
9. See id. at 545 (discussing Aristotle's method of determining equality).

10. Id.
11.

Id. at 547.
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concludes that the constitutional concept of equal protection under the
12

law is "an empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own."
Any principle of justice based on this empty idea of equality is
vacuous as well. The foundation of justice is "giving every person his
due." 13 The equality principle's declaration that persons who are alike
should be treated alike indicates that treating people equally means
giving them their "due." To argue that justice requires that persons who
are alike should be treated alike, therefore, has no genuine meaning
unless the argument contains some moral basis for determining whether
they are alike in such a way as to make morally proper their similar
treatment. Accordingly, an idea of justice based only on the principle of
moral or legal
equality has no meaning apart from "substantive
' 14
standards that determine what is one's 'due."'
Westen acknowledges that this insight into the circular nature of
"equality" is not new. 15 Indeed, he posits that Aristotle's equality
maxim has had staying power partly because it expresses an
unassailable (if unhelpful) tautology.' 6 Nonetheless, shortly after
Westen authored his seminal work, a host of scholars began a feverish
17
effort to inject some independent meaning into the idea of equality.
18
Westen, however, effectively discarded these arguments.
More recently, Professors Christopher Peters and Kent Greenwalt
have tried to resurrect the principle of equality. 19 Professor Peters

argues that the principle of "prescriptive equality" is not meaningless.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 556.
14. Id. at 557.
15. Id.at 544-48.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81
MICH. L. REv. 575 (1983) (arguing that none of Westen's criticisms of the idea of equality are in
any way inherent to that concept); William Cohen, Is Equal ProtectionLike Oakland? Equality
as a Surrogatefor Other Rights, 59 TUL. L. REv. 884 (1985) (contending that many decisions
based on the Equal Protection Clause can only be understood by adopting constitutional values
from different sources in the Constitution); Anthony D'Amato, Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?,
81 MICH. L. REV. 600 (1983) (using a hypothetical case to challenge Westen's notion that
equality has no substantive quality); Kent Greenwalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1107 (1983) (arguing that equality is derived from the rights people have);
Westen, The Meaning of Equality, supra note 7 (contending that the concept of equality is empty
and confusing).
18. See Westen, The Meaning of Equality, supra note 7, at 604 (replying to the challenges to
his assertions set forth by Erwin Chemerinsky and Anthony D'Amato).
19. See Kent Greenwalt, "PrescriptiveEquality": Two Steps Forward, 110 HARv. L. REV.
1265, 1273 (1997) (arguing that the principle of equality carries normative force); Christopher J.
Peters, Equality Revisited, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1211 (1997) (arguing that equality's typical
emptiness does not stem from inevitable tautology).

498
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Under the principle of prescriptive equality, the "bare fact that a person
has been treated in a certain way is a reason in itself for treating another
identically-situated person in the same way." 20 Once it is determined
that two persons are identically situated, Peters contends, the equality
21
principle has meaning because it requires their identical treatment.
Professor Peters concedes, however, that if this prescriptive principle
does have any meaning, that meaning is misguided because it may lead
to treating equals equally, even if that treatment is unjust.2 2 For
example, Professor Peters imagines a competition for scarce resources
in which eleven drowning people compete for only ten available spots
on a lifeboat. 23 Because the principle of prescriptive equality presumes
that all of them be treated equally, none of them may receive lifeboat
spots and all of them (equally) may drown.2 4 Accordingly, Peters
concludes that the principle of equality is either irrelevant or harmful
when there are conditions of scarcity.
Professor Greenwalt agrees with Peters that the principle of equality
does not always lead to "right action." 26 Still, Professor Greenwalt
contends that the equality principle has presumptive force because it
"might pull some people to treat equals equal,
although other
2
considerations would suggest a different outcome."
For example, the
principle of equality creates a presumption favoring equal distributions
of lifeboat spots, even though that presumption may be rebutted by
stronger values such as saving lives. Professor Greenwalt argues that
even if the principle of equality sometimes may be overcome by
countervailing interests, that principle still has meaning. 28 He suggests

that the equality "principle may express deep-rooted feelings, not easily
29
dispelled, to which decision-makers appropriately are responsive."
Professor Westen has anticipated and discarded these arguments as
well. 30 He demonstrates that any deeply-rooted presumption favoring
equal treatment is inconsistent with the maxim of equality itself. The
equality principle contains absolutely no presumption or preference for
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Peters, supra note 19, at 1223.
Id.at 1217, 1223-27.
Id at 1220-21.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1238.
Id. at 1238-39.
Greenwalt, supra note 19, at 1277.

27. Id.

28. Id at 1271-73.
29. Id at 1273.
30. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, supra note 3, at 571-73 (discussing the irony of the
equality principle demanding unequal treatment).
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like treatment. To the contrary, it demands unlike treatment in cases
where people are determined to be unalike.3 1 The equality principle
cannot justify any presumption favoring or opposing any law because
all laws treat some people differently from others for some purposes.
Although there may be deeply-rooted feelings supporting the rhetoric
that like cases should be treated in a like manner, that rhetoric would
also demand that unlike cases should be treated in an unlike manner.
When the inevitable questions are asked about which likenesses are
meaningful and which like treatments are appropriate, those deeplyrooted feelings manifest themselves in a passion for particular
substantive values that have nothing to do with equality. Not
surprisingly, those substantive values-and not the principle of
equality-guide important judicial interpretations of the United States
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.
THE CONSTITUTION'S PHATIC EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLE

Westen's enduring contribution to serious thought about equality may
well be his critique of the abuses of the equality principle in legal and
political discourse surrounding the Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause. 32 Once it is conceded that the Equal Protection Clause does not
require all persons to be treated alike, that Clause (like the equality
principle itself) cannot be interpreted without relying upon a legal or
moral standard anterior to equality. Even scholars who doubt Westen's
premise that equality is meaningless cannot deny his assertion that
many judicial interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause rely on the
and results that are
empty rhetoric of equality to support presumptions
33
equality.
to
unrelated
values
rooted in substantive
This insight is particularly instructive in understanding the Supreme
Court's recent equal protection decisions regarding race-conscious and
gender-conscious educational programs. 34 Under the Supreme Court's
31. Id.
32. The Equal Protection Clause in the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 17 at 902 (arguing that judges use equality as a rationale for
deciding cases which are really based on other substantive values in order to "avoid larger
issues").
34. See discussion infra, THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES and THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES IN

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES (discussing the Supreme Court's contemporary approach to
gender and race-conscious education programs, applying strict scrutiny to race-based
classifications in education allowing only the most narrowly-tailored laws to survive and
requiring the state to present exceedingly-persuasive justifications for gender-conscious education
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three-tiered Equal Protection Clause analysis, a state educational
program that affects a "suspect class" such as an underrepresented racial
minority will be strictly scrutinized to determine whether it violates the
Fourteenth Amendment. 3 5 Under the "strict scrutiny" standard, any
state regulation which classifies people based on their race will be
presumed to violate the Equal Protection Clause; the presumption of
unconstitutionality cannot be rebutted unless the state can show that its
regulation is finely tailored to achieve a compelling or substantial state
interest. 3 6 Under the "intermediate" standard of scrutiny, all state
educational programs distinguishing people based on characteristics
such as gender also are presumed to be "unequal;" a presumption of
unconstitutionality that cannot be rebutted unless the state can provide
an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its law. 37 In light of
Westen's insights, however, it is clear that the Supreme Court's scrutiny
of race-conscious and gender-conscious educational programs actually
is based on substantive, political standards that have nothing to do with
equality itself.
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND RACIAL DIFFERENCES
IN EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

The concept of equality obfuscates important judicial decisions
governing race-conscious educational policies. This is apparent in the
significant Supreme Court decisions affecting racial segregation and
affirmative action in education.
3 8 in
One of Westen's own examples is Sweatt v. Painter,
which the
Supreme Court held that a state statute barring African-American
students from attending an all-white law school violates the Equal
Protection Clause. 39
According to Westen, the statute's
constitutionality cannot be determined by reference to any equality
and noting the danger in treating "unlike" people as "equals").
35. See Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, supra note 3, at 561 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 460 (1980), in describing the Supreme Court's application of the strict scrutiny
standard).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that a state
university policy limiting enrollment to women in its nursing school violated the Equal Protection
Clause). All other state regulations will be upheld under the most lenient scrutiny, so long as the
regulation is rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest. See Westen, The Empty
Idea of Equality, supra note 3, at 569 (describing the Supreme Court's scrutiny for cases which
implicate neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification); see also Mass. Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (holding that a state statute requiring retirement
for police officers over fifty years of age is constitutional).
38. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)
39. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, supra note 3, at 566.
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principle in the Equal Protection Clause. It is meaningless to assert that
Sweatt should be admitted to the all-white school simply because "like
cases should be treated in a like manner. ' 4° Rather, "[t]he real question
...

a
was whether Sweatt's race would be allowed to make '41

co-applicants.
constitutional difference between Sweatt and his white
That question can only be answered by a "substantive idea of the
''42 In
kinds of wrongs from which a person has the right to be free.
order to conclude that racial differences are "constitutionally irrelevant"
for admissions purposes, a court must decide that "excluding blacks
from law school on the basis of race causes them a kind of injury not
' 3 If,
caused in cases in which using race is conceded to be acceptable.'
but only if, the Court determines that Sweatt has the right to be free
from the injury of being denied admission to an all-white school
because of his race, can the court then say that the state has treated him
unequally by treating him differently from persons who the court has
independently determined are the "same" in constitutionally relevant
respects. 44 While the court may lace its opinion in the rhetoric of
equality, the decision to allow Sweatt to be treated "like" white
applicants in admissions to law school is actually based on the
independent judgment that African-American applicants
45 to law school
admissions.
in
injury
racial
should not be subjected to
From this perspective, not even Brown v. Board of Education, which

stands as an enduring symbol of racial equality, can be justified by the
equality principle alone. 46 The Court in Brown declared7 that racially
' 4 As Westen
segregated educational facilities are "inherently unequal.
shows, however, there is no such thing as "inherent" inequality. The
actual reasoning of Brown is that state laws which impose racial
segregation in public education violate the Equal Protection Clause

40. ld.at 566-67.
41. Id. at 566.
42. Id. at 567.
43. Id. at 566.
44. Id.at 567.
45. Id. at 568.
46. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregating children in
public schools on the basis of race is unconstitutional, even when both facilities and tangible
factors are equal, because children are still deprived of equal educational opportunities).
47. Id. at 495. The Brown Court actually goes out of its way to make clear that some of the
schools at issue in that case which were attended by African-American students were "like" the
schools attended by white students in their tangible facilities and resources. Id. The Court
declares that the racially-segregated schools in the case, "have been equalized, or are being
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other

'tangible' factors." Id. at 492.
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because they injure African-American school children. According to
Brown, even if such laws were to provide for equal educational
resources, they would nevertheless be unconstitutional because they
would have a "detrimental effect" on African-American students. 48 The

Court emphasized that the laws (1) perpetuate a stereotype harmful to
African-American students; (2) reinforce a stigma of inferiority
injurious to African-American students; (3) generate a feeling of lesser

status that hurts the hearts and minds of African-American students; (4)
retard the mental and educational development of African-American

students; and (5) deny to African-American students the educational
benefits of attending a racially-integrated school. 4 9 As in Sweatt, the

Brown case becomes consistent with equality only after it is first

determined that African-American children are "like" white children in
their right to be free from the "injury" of segregated schools, or in their

right to be free from the "injury" of being denied the opportunity to
attend a diverse school. Brown can be understood only by looking to
these important substantive values apart from equality.

Because the rhetoric of equality is hollow, the Supreme Court is able
to use that rhetoric in its recent school desegregation decisions to undo
the substantive values of Brown. Declaring that "[r]acial balance is not
to be achieved for its own sake,"5 ° the Supreme Court has indicated that
state desegregation efforts violate the Equal Protection Clause unless
they are finely-tailored to remedy proven cases of legally-mandated or
intentionally-imposed segregation.
State programs designed to make

48. Id. at 494.
49. Id. at 494-95. For an excellent analysis of the judicial and political efforts to facilitate the
resegregation of American public schools, see generally GARY ORFIELD, ET AL., DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1997)
(describing the current segregated condition of America's schools). See also JONATHAN KOZOL,
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES (1991) (describing the detrimental effects of unequal government funding
to America's schools).
50. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992). "Where resegregation is not the product of
state action but of private choice, it does not have constitutional implications. It is beyond the
authority ... of the federal courts to try to counteract these kinds of continuous and massive
demographic shifts." Id. at 495. Freeman indicates that any voluntary governmental policy
designed to achieve racial balance in educational institutions generally would itself violate the
principle of equality in the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
51. See, e.g., id.at 495-96 (noting that though past wrongs have been committed to the black
race, those wrongs cannot be used to exaggerate the legal consequences). Specifically, the
Freeman court noted:
Past wrongs to the black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are a
stubborn fact of history ...But though we cannot escape our history, neither must we
overstate its consequences in fixing legal responsibilities ...the District Court was
correct to entertain the suggestion that [the school district] had no duty to achieve
system-wide racial balance in the student population.
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desegregation attractive by enhancing the quality of schools attended by
African-American students violate the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court suggests, because they treat African-American students
52 By this logic, African-American
differently from white students.
students are deemed to be "like" white students in all respects relevant
to educational opportunity and therefore they must be treated like white
students with regard to educational programs. The Court's rhetoric here
hides its substantive judgment that any differences between the actual
educational opportunities afforded white children and those afforded
African-American children either do not exist or are irrelevant for
The declaration that African-American
constitutional purposes.
like white students is used to legitimize
just
students should be treated
the reality that their educational opportunities are not at all alike.
The empty rhetoric of equality also is evident in the Court's decisions
regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious school admissions
53 opinion in Regents of the
policies. Justice Powell's "touchstone"
University of Californiav. Bakke begins with the assertion that "equal
and
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual,
' 54 Yet, as
color.
another
of
person
a
something else when applied to
Westen shows, equal protection always means one thing when applied
to one individual, and something else when applied to another
individual, if those two individuals are adjudged to be different in a
relevant respect. Indeed, Justice Powell himself indicates that "the
attainment of a diverse student body" is a compelling 55interest that
from another.
justifies the treatment of one race differently
In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court accepts Justice Powell's
view in Bakke that "student body diversity is a compellini state interest
The Court
that can justify the use of race in university admissions."
Id.; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88-90 (1995) (holding that efforts to integrate
are
school district by developing attractive schools designed to equalize academic achievement
unconstitutional and beyond the scope of permissible remedies for equal protection violations).
of
52. See, e.g., Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 88-89 (discussing the state program's unequal treatment
students based on race).
of Cal. v.
53. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003) (citing Regents of the Univ.
(1978)).
265
U.S.
438
Bakke,
Powell
54. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978). Justice
290.
at
Id.
equal."
is
not
it
then
protection,
continues: "If both are not accorded the same
55. Id.at 311-14.
56. Grutter,539 U.S. at 324. Justice Powell stated in Bakke:
[A]ttainment of a diverse student body] clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal
for an institution of higher education. Academic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body.
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recognizes that when it strictly scrutinizes all governmental "uses of
race," it does so in order to take "relevant" differences between the
races into account. 57 The Court acknowledges that "[c]ontext matters"
and not every "decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable .... In other words, African-American applicants to
college and graduate school may not be "like" white applicants to
college and graduate school in a relevant respect. An African-American
student may bring an element of diversity to the educational institution
which is different from that brought by a white student.
Yet, because all governmental programs treat some people differently
from others, the question is again reduced to whether the Supreme
Court is willing to recognize the moral significance of the distinction
made between applicants. In Grutter, the Court recognizes that the
State of Michigan has valuable reasons for treating applicants of one
race differently from those of another, reasons which survive strict
scrutiny. The Supreme Court, however, has found only two political
values to be so compelling as to justify governmental policies which
treat persons differently because of their race: (I remedying past
discrimination against members of a racial minority; and (2) attaining
a diverse student body. 60 Reduced to the equality principle, the Court
indicates that African-American students are like white students in
every other circumstance except victimization by specific, proven, and
past acts of racial injury and the capacity to bring diversity.
Suppose, instead, that the Court were to acknowledge that the
educational opportunities available to African-American students also
are different from those available to white students due to their different
history of injury from a legally-enforced "system of racial caste" in
education and their different condition of injuries from "conscious and
unconscious race bias," educational segregation, and inadequate
educational resources. 6 1 The recognition of these actual differences
Bakke, 438 U.S at 312.
57. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (citing Adarand Constr. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995)).
58. Id. at 308.
59. See, e.g., Adarand,515 U.S. 200 (proposing that only the compelling interest in redressing
specific acts of proven past racial discrimination could justify a finely-tailored racial affirmative
action program); Richmond v. J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (suggesting
racial
classifications are reserved for precise remedial measures).
60. Grutter,539 U.S. at 332.
61. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298-301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing
that an equal standard of review in the college admission process will not remedy an
unequal
society). The "detrimental effect" on African-American students from educational inequity
has
not dissipated since Brown. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Racial segregation in public
schools
persists. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg J., concurring) (contending that a continuing

2005]

Concerning Justice in Educational Opportunities

would justify (if not mandate) governmental action that treated AfricanAmericans differently from white Americans in the respects by which
they are adjudged to be different. Any educational program that failed
to recognize and remedy these differences in educational opportunities

would be presumed unconstitutional on the grounds that the law would

treat unlike cases in a like manner.
In its Gratz v. Bollinger decision, however, the Supreme Court

effectively presumed the unconstitutionality of any serious effort by the
government to recognize racial differences in educational
opportunities. 6 2

In Gratz, the Court declared unconstitutional the

University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions policy: "[w]e find
that the University's policy, which automatically distributes 20 points,

or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to every single
'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of race, is not
diversity ... ,,63
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational
The undergraduate policy fails because, unlike the law school's policy

upheld in Grutter, it does not provide for "meaningful individualized

review of applicants." 64 Instead, in treating the underrepresented
minority applicant the same, the undergraduate program violates the
Equal Protection Clause. 6 5 Appealing again to the sentiment of
equality, the Court concludes that the University's race-conscious
affirmative action policy will not fuel an unequal college admissions policy, rather it will alleviate
the need for affirmative action); E. FRANKENBERG, ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM?, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARV.
UNIV. 1, 4 (Jan. 2003) (indicating that, in 2000-2001, figures show that 71.6% of AfricanAmerican children and 76.3% of Hispanic children attended schools in which minorities make up
a majority of the school body); see also DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004) (discussing
continued segregation in modem American schools); SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF
INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004)
(describing how race and social class categorization can restrict upward mobility); GARY
ORFIELD & CHRISTOPHER LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE?, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARV. UNIV. (Jan. 2004) (showing that U.S. schools are becoming more
segregated); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 273-74 (1999)
(discussing the difficulties of achieving racial integration); Kevin Carey, The Funding Gap: Low
Income and Minority Students Still Receive Fewer Dollars in Many States, THE EDUCATION
TRUST FALL 2003, at 1, 9 (indicating that thirty-seven states provide significantly fewer costadjusted resources to those school districts which educate mostly underrepresented minority
students and that throughout the nation, each student in a district which educates primarily
underrepresented minorities receives an average of $1,030 less in annual educational resources
than students who are educated in a primarily white district).
62. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269-70 (setting forth the strict scrutiny standard to which such efforts
will be subjected).
63. Id. at 270.
64. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).

506
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policy subjects non-minority applicants to "unequal treatment. 6 6
The Court's rhetoric conceals its substantive judgment about the
presumed similarities between underrepresented minority applicants and
other applicants. Based on the rhetoric of equality, the Court presumes
that underrepresented minority applicants should be treated like all other
applicants.
To presume that race-conscious remedies violate the
equality principle is to presume that no racial differences exist. If
underrepresented minority applicants are not actually like other
applicants in their educational opportunities, then treating them as if
they were like those other applicants cannot be fairly justified by the
equality principle.
Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, argues that underrepresented
minorities in fact are not like other applicants in a respect that should be
relevant to whether they are treated alike by a college admissions
program: "[i]n the wake of 'a system of racial caste only recently ended'
... large disparities endure." 6 7
If "large disparities" between
underrepresented minority applicants and other applicants exist, then the
state's failure to recognize those disparities is to treat unlike cases in a
like manner. As Justice Ginsburg suggests, to judge educational
programs which benefit African-Americans in the same way as
programs that injure them is to ignore the history and contemporary
reality of differences in educational opportunity. Although the Court
employs the rhetoric of equality, 68 its holding is really based on its
political judgment that significant racial differences in educational
opportunity should have little constitutional significance.
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND GENDER DIFFERENCES IN
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

The principle of equality also masks the substantive values
supporting the Supreme Court's equal protection decisions affecting
gender in educational institutions. In United States v. Virginia, the
Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause precludes the State
of Virginia from exclusively reserving to men the unique educational
opportunities offered by its all-male Virginia Military Institute. 6 9 The
Court describes the process by which the issue of the constitutionality of
66. Id. at 270 (citing Adarand Const., Inc. v. Pefla, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)).
67. Id. at 299-300 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Adarand,515 U.S. at 273 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)).
68. See, e.g., id. at 270 (suggesting that the threshold question is whether the use of race in
admissions violates the Equal Protection Clause).

69. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996).
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any state "classification" based on gender must be resolved: "Focusing
on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is
sought, the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered
is
justification is 'exceedingly persuasive.' The
70 burden of justification
State."
the
on
entirely
demanding and it rests
This formulation appears to establish a presumption of equality.
Women should be treated the same as men, unless the reasons for the
Yet, the
"differential" treatment can be persuasively justified.
device.
rhetorical
another
only
is
here
presumption of equality
not
does
Virginia's maintenance of a single-sex military academy
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because it treats like cases in
an unlike manner. Rather, the Court declares that men and women are
not like cases in significant ways: the physical differences are
"enduring;" men and women are not "fungible;" a community of one
sex is "different" from a community of both sexes.7 1 The Court
72 even
describes the differences between men and women as "inherent."
If, as the Court concludes, men and women are fundamentally
different, any consistent principle or presumption of equality should
have led the Court to demand a justification for any law that does not
treat them differently. Yet, the Court also recognizes that women may
be justly treated unlike men for some purposes, but not for others.
Hence, "[s]ex classifications" (i.e., treating women unlike men) are
good (morally proper forms of discrimination) if they are designed to
compensate women for economic disabilities, to promote employment
opportunities or to "advance full development of the talent and
capacities of our Nation's people." 73 On the other hand, the Court
declares that legislation that treats men differently from women is
the legal, social, and
unjust if it is designed "to create
74 or perpetuate
women."
of
inferiority
economic
To some extent, the Court acknowledges Westen's point: women and
men are alike in some significant ways and not alike in significant ways,
and women may be justly treated the same as men in some ways and
may be justly treated differently from men in other ways. The Court,
although purporting to rely upon an equality justification for its holding,
seems to recognize that the Virginia statute cannot be declared
unconstitutional simply because it treats some men differently from
70. Id. at 533.
71. Id. (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 533-34.
74. Id. at 534.
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some women. Instead, the statute is unconstitutional because it injures

women by denying to them a substantive right which is wholly apart
from equality: the right to an educational opportunity. 7 5 If there is a
principle that emerges from this case, it is not the equality principle.
Rather, it is the recognition of the injury resulting to women from the
denial of a unique educational opportunity.
Nor can the equality principle alone resolve the question of the

legitimacy (or constitutionality) of instructional practices which treat
female students the same as male students in the classroom.

The

rhetoric of equality seems to render suspicious any differences between
the education of men and women. Suppose, however, that there are
significant differences in the way in which men and women learn. If
female learners are adjudged to be unlike male learners in significant
respects, then treating them in a like manner in an educational
institution would appear to disserve the equality principle. If it is
determined that men and women are different learners, then there
should be a presumption against treating them the same way in the

classroom. The equality principle begs the question of whether male
learners are like female learners in such a way to make unjust any
program that treats them as if they were not alike.
The question of whether men and women learn differently can be
answered by descriptive evidence. In fact, all of the available, credible
evidence indicates that female learners are fundamentally different from
male learners. 76 For example, research indicates that in the elementary
75. See id. at 534 (holding that barring women from attending the publicly-funded Virginia
Military Institute was unconstitutional). It is not clear whether the right being denied is the right
to an educational opportunity, or the right to a unique educational opportunity. In a footnote, the
Virginia Court observed:
[We] do not question the Commonwealth's prerogative evenhandedly to support
diverse educational opportunities. We address specifically and only an educational
opportunity recognized by the District Court and the Court of Appeals as 'unique,' ...
an opportunity available only at Virginia's premier military institute, the
Commonwealth's sole single-sex public university or college.
Id.at 534 n.7.
76. There is evidence demonstrating significant differences in the way in which men and
women (and boys and girls) process information. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (demonstrating that
women perceive and construe reality differently from men); MICHAEL GuRIAN,BOYS AND GIRLS
LEARN DIFFERENTLY! (2001) (establishing that gender affects the brain in many significant
ways). In typical elementary school classrooms, girls outperform boys in nearly every subject.
Linda L. Peter, What Remains of Public Choice and Parental Rights: Does the VMl Decision
Preclude Exclusive Schools or Classes Based upon Gender?, 33 CAL. W.L. REV. 249, 263
(1997) (stating that girls finish elementary school performing better than boys on standardized
tests in all subjects but science). By middle school, .however, girls' standardized test scores drop
relative to boys, especially in math and science. Id. This disparity grows throughout the
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grades, gender differences in the biological development of the brain
generally enable girls to see and to read better than boys in low light,
7
while boys are able to see and to read better than girls in bright light.
Accordingly, a governmental program that provides for "bright light"
throughout a public school may violate the equality principle as much as
a governmental program that prevents female students from taking
science classes. A policy providing uniform "bright light" treats unlike
cases in a like manner.

It treats female students the same as male

students, even though their opportunities to learn at an "equal" level of
light are fundamentally different. The consistent use of bright light
injures female students by denying to them an educational opportunity.
Yet, the courts likely would not presume that such a program violates
the Equal Protection Clause because the program seems to provide
equal treatment to male and female students. Nor would any showing

of an "exceedingly persuasive justification" likely have to be made to
justify this apparent "equal" treatment of boys and girls. On the other
hand, an educational policy which enables male students, but not female

students, to take science classes treats people differently even though
men and women may be adjudged to be the same in their capacity to
learn science. That educational policy will receive heightened judicial
scrutiny because it appears to treat like cases in an unlike manner.

The real issue in both cases, however, is not equality. The issue
should be whether governmental programs injure female students by
denying to them an educational opportunity. Both programs should be
education process. In 2000, the National Center for Educational Statistics confirmed that after
elementary school, boys acquire a significant advantage over girls in math and science.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, TRENDS INEDUCATIONAL EQUITY OF GIRLS
60-67 (March 3, 2000). Some commentators attribute such testing disparities to inherent
biological differences in learning styles between the sexes. Peter, supra, at 263. Others suggest
that this disparity results from the preferential treatment boys receive from their teachers, either
because they raise their hands more often in class, speak out of turn, or are otherwise less
disciplined than girls. Id. at 264; see MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS:
How AMERICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS 138 (1994) (noting the decline of girls' success on
standardized tests over the course of their education).
Michael Gurian attributes the differences to evolved biological gender dissimilarities in the
brain that influence learning. See GURIAN, supra, at 57-59 ("[B]rain systems explain why girls
on average don't like math as much as boys and boys generally don't like reading and writing as
much"). In particular, Gurian argues that boys and girls learn in fundamentally different ways
and at different rates. Id. at 36-37, 59. Gurian concludes that because of their different brain
compositions and different learning styles, "both boys and girls are victims of gender
disadvantage in our schools." Id. at 63. According to Gurian, therefore, the ultimate educational
environment would confront the disadvantages in the brain chemistry of both males and females
and adjust instructional practices to meet the specific educational needs of each gender. Id. at 66,
294.
77. See GURIAN, supra note 76, at 36-37 (displaying the results of experiments on children
younger than eighteen).
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suspect, not because they are unequal, but because they injure female
students' opportunities to learn. If male and female students are
adjudged to be alike in their entitlement to the opportunity to learn, then
any governmental program which denies that opportunity would not
treat like cases in a like manner. The substantive value at stake is the
opportunity to learn, not equality.
A program of gender-segregation in education, therefore, cannot be
fairly attacked simply because it appears to be "unequal."
In
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Supreme Court
expressly declined to reach "the question of whether States can provide
'separate but equal' undergraduate institutions for males and females." 78
There is a significant body of research suggesting that girls and boys
alike benefit from gender-segregated classrooms. 79 The American Civil
Liberties Union, however, argues that "[s]ingle-sex education is at best
a 'sound-good method' because it is based upon misconceptions about
the abilities and preferences of girls and boys rather than empirical
evidence." 8° The debate in the courts and in the political sector will no

78. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720 n.1 (1982).
79. Peter, supra note 76, at 264 (citing SADKER & SADKER, supra note 76, at 233). In a 2000
survey of 4,200 girls' school graduates, more than eighty percent reported they were better
prepared to succeed in the co-ed world precisely because they went to a single sex school. Meg
Moulton & Whitney Ransome, With Fewer Distractions, Students Will Do Better, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Aug. 26, 2003). Without boys in the classroom, girls speak up more,
take more science and math courses, obtain more advanced degrees and hold more high-ranking
positions in large companies. Id; see also Kay Bailey Hutchinson, The Lesson of Single-Sex
Public Education: Both Successful and Constitutional, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2001)
(citing Susan Estrich, Ideologues Decry Single-Sex Education, But Girls Benefit, DENV. POST,
May 22, 1998, at B11, to describe the specific benefits boys and girls will receive from a singlesex education). According to statistics published by The National Coalition of Girls' Schools,
girls attending single-sex schools typically score thirty percent higher on Scholastic Achievement
Tests ("SAT") than the girls' national average. Julia Morgan School for Girls, Why a Girls'
School?, at http://www.juliamorganschool.org/girls.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2004). In addition,
almost one hundred percent of girls' school graduates go on to college and are twice as likely to
earn doctorates. Id. Some commentators suggest that boys also benefit from single-sex education
because they are more likely to focus on their studies, express themselves more freely and pursue
nontraditional arts and literature degrees. See Peter, supra note 76, at 264 n. 107, 108 (suggesting
that boys in single-sex schools have better appreciation for art and literature, but cautioning that
all boys schools may encourage sexist views).
80. Laura W. Murphy, Single-Sex Notice ofIntent, Comments to the Departmentof Education,
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION LEGISLATIVE UPDATE (July 8, 2002), available at
http://www.aclu.orgiWomensRights/Womensrights.cfm?ID=l 0481 &c=l 74.
The
ACLU
observed that if similar characteristics found in single-sex schools, such as smaller class rooms,
extensive resources, well-trained teachers, and advanced educational methods were available in
public (co-ed) schools, measurable differences between single-sex education and co-educational
programs would disappear. Id. The ACLU also argues that single-sex schools undermine Title
IX, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and foster sex discrimination.
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doubt be peppered with appeals to equality. Yet, the principle of
equality is unhelpful; it both supports and opposes gender segregation in
education. The real issue is whether gender segregation injures women
by denying to them a substantive right to educational opportunity, and
whether the courts will recognize that injury.
CONCLUSION:
BEYOND EQUALITY AND TOWARD EDUCATIONAL PRINCIPLES

In all of its meaningful opinions regarding race-conscious and
gender-conscious educational programs, the Supreme Court appeals to
the rhetoric of equality. That rhetoric may appear compelling, but it is
as vacuous as the equality principle on which it is based. The rhetoric
of equality typically masks substantive, political, or moral judgments
unrelated to equality itself.
The Supreme Court's decisions in the arena of education may well be
based on substantive judgments about the importance of educational
opportunity. Although the Court thus far has rejected the existence of a
fundamental constitutional right to educational opportunity, 8 1 it
nonetheless seems to have quietly recognized the substantive value of
educational opportunity in its equal protection decisions.
Suppose the Court's equal protection decisions actually conceal the
substantive judgment that women and underrepresented minorities
should have the right not to be denied meaningful educational
opportunities, and that any denial to them of such educational
opportunities would result in an unconstitutional injury. What then?

81. See San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding the constitutionality of a
Texas school financing system which left poor students residing in school districts with a low
property tax base with a much lower yearly expenditure per student). But see Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986) ("[T]his Court has not yet definitively settled the question whether a
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right"); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1981)
("Public education is not [a] 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution, but neither is it
merely some governmental 'benefit."').

